Exporting Frigates to Australia (Part I: Why Japan Won the Bid)

The Need for Fundamental Naval Reinforcement

The backdrop to Australia’s consideration of a New FFM (Upgraded Mogami-class Frigate) as a candidate for its next general-purpose frigate lies in the delay of the Hunter-class program, originally intended as the replacement for the Anzac-class, amid a rapidly deteriorating security outlook shaped by the war in Ukraine and an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.

Eight Anzac-class frigates, introduced beginning in 1996, had long served as the fleet’s mainstay. In 2018, BAE Systems’ Hunter-class was selected as their successor. However, repeated changes to requirements during the design phase caused major disruption, driving costs to roughly AUD 9 billion per ship and significantly delayed its entry into service.

The turning point came with the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) of 2023 and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) of April 2024. Both documents described Australia’s security environment as the “most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War” and underscored the need for a rapid naval buildup. As a result, the Hunter-class program was cut from nine ships to six, while plans were set to acquire up to eleven new frigates with strong anti-submarines and general-purpose capabilities—more than doubling the surface combatant fleet. To accelerate delivery, the first three vessels would be built overseas.

Candidates were limited to proven designs: Japan’s Mogami-class (MHI), Germany’s MEKO A-200 (TKMS), Spain’s Alfa3000 (Navantia), and South Korea’s Daegu-class Batch II (Hanwha) and Batch III (Hyundai). In November 2024, Australia’s Department of Defence narrowed the field to the Japanese and German proposals, with a final selection expected by late 2025. Since production of the Mogami-class was set to end in 2027, the actual Japanese bid rested on the New FFM variant.

Although detailed evaluation criteria were not disclosed, the Australian Navy likely assessed proposals against its operational concepts. Spain’s Alfa3000 likely fell short due to limited range and displacement, while the Korean designs were disadvantaged by low freeboard, reducing seaworthiness. Given Australia’s vast sea lanes with the United States, long range and high endurance were indispensable.

In August 2025—months ahead of schedule—the Albanese administration announced the New FFM as the winner. While the reasons for the accelerated decision remain unclear, the government’s consistent emphasis on strengthening naval power “as quickly as possible” suggests it saw no need for further deliberation once the frontrunner was evident.

A Design Suited to Operational Concepts

Why did the Albanese administration choose the New FFM over the A-200? The Department of Defence’s announcement suggests two main reasons.

First, assured delivery schedules. The Royal Australian Navy prioritized rapid introduction above all else, insisting on proven designs and avoiding bespoke modifications after the Hunter-class experience. Therefore, MHI—with its long record of delivering destroyers on time to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), including mass production of the Mogami-class—appeared as a reliable partner. Construction of the New FFM for the JMSDF is scheduled to begin this year, and Australian ships have already been incorporated into the production schedule. This record and visibility of the program gave Australia confidence in Japan’s ability to deliver early capability.

Although “delivery” has not been clearly defined in Australia’s readouts, emphasis seems to be on physical handover rather than initial operational capability (IOC). This reflects the political and deterrence value of commissioning ships. That said, because the New FFM program enables pre-delivery crew training at shore facilities, Australia is likely to achieve IOC relatively quickly.

Second, range and firepower aligned with operational concepts. Long endurance capabilities were essential, and the New FFM’s 10,000-nautical-mile cruising distance matched Australia’s requirement to defend long sea lanes without relying on replenishment vessels. Firepower was another critical factor: the Royal Australian Navy faces shortages in this area, and the New FFM addresses it by equipping 32 strike module-type vertical launch system (VLS) cells, capable of loading Tomahawk cruise missiles and large surface-to-air missiles like the SM-6.

Although deploying these missiles requires additional consoles and network upgrades, physical compatibility is a prerequisite. The New FFM meets this requirement. Furthermore, Australia has prioritized interoperability with U.S. and Japanese forces. In July 2025, its navy concluded an agreement with the JMSDF and U.S. Navy on mutual support for missile reloads and refueling, designed to support “distributed fleet lethality”. On the other hand, in the eyes of the Department of Defence, Germany’s A-200 could only employ European missiles, which made it as an inferior candidate when executing this operational concept.

Lessons for Japan

Contrary to expectations, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles stated that Japan’s strategic relationship with Australia “didn’t influence it at all” on the frigate decision. If taken at face value, Japan may have overlearned the lesson from its failed bid to export Sōryū-class submarines in 2016—namely, that political factors are decisive. That failure was often attributed not to technical shortcomings, but to deficiencies in lobbying and public engagement. In the frigate bid, Japan worked hard to avoid repeating those mistakes, mounting extensive promotional campaigns focusing on strategic relationship, inviting media, and forming joint public-private committees.

Yet one critical point was often overlooked in reflecting on the submarine failure: whether the platform suited the recipient’s operational concepts. The Sōryū-class was optimized for operations near Japan, but not for Australia’s requirement to deploy over long distances. This was later confirmed when Australia abandoned the plan for French-designed conventionally powered submarines and instead opted to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in cooperation with the U.S. and U.K. The Australians needed submarines not just with superior weapon systems but with long legs.

In the frigate competition, Australia’s overriding concern was how to defend the sea lanes from the Chinese military. Japan’s New FFM best matched this operational need—particularly in range and firepower—and that compatibility proved decisive.

Strategic relationships and political messaging matter for defense exports. But equally important is accurately grasping the partner’s operational requirements and tailoring proposals accordingly. Rather than just selling what Japan sees fit for itself or relying on bilateral ties, Japan must engage sincerely with partners’ needs. Through its experiences with both submarines and frigates in Australia, Japan has gained valuable lessons for the future of defense equipment transfers.

(Photo Credit: JS Mogami (FFM-1) under review at the International Fleet Review 2022, Reiwa 4 Fiscal Year. CC BY 4.0 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9b/JS_Mogami%EF%BC%88FFM-1%EF%BC%89under_review_at_the_International_Fleet_Review_2022.jpg?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this IOG Commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the API, the Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG) or any other organizations to which the author belongs.

API/IOG English Newsletter

Edited by Paul Nadeau, the newsletter will monthly keep up to date on geoeconomic agenda, IOG Intelligencce report, geoeconomics briefings, IOG geoeconomic insights, new publications, events, research activities, media coverage, and more.

Click here to subscribe