Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) amid US-China strategic competition: The Global South’s agency in era of geoeconomics

Extravagant Spending Amid Economic Challenges

In September 2024, China gathered leaders from all 53 African countries,^[1] excluding Eswatini, with which it has no diplomatic ties, for the ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC 9) in Beijing—the largest “home-ground diplomacy”^[2] event of the year. In his keynote speech, President Xi Jinping proudly declared that “the China-Africa relationship is currently at its best in its 70-year history.”^[3] However, in stark contrast to the grandeur of the international conference, China’s economy remains in a slump, with sluggish production, consumption, and investment dragging on growth.^[4] Despite these challenges, FOCAC 9 concluded with the adoption of two major agreements: the “Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era” (hereafter referred to as the “Beijing Declaration”^[5]) and the “FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)” (hereafter referred to as the “Beijing Action Plan”^[6]). Importantly, the Beijing Declaration praises FOCAC as a model for “South-South Cooperation,” where countries of the Global South help each other achieve development, suggesting that China-Africa cooperation differs from the top-down, donor-driven approach taken by developed nations when engaging with Africa. The Chinese government hailed these as significant diplomatic achievements.

The world has long turned its attention to Africa, which makes up a significant part of the Global South. Many countries have held “Africa+1” summits^[7]—such as FOCAC—as a means to strengthen relations with the continent. The trend began in 1993, when Japan took the initiative to launch the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).^[8] Today, numerous countries, including Western nations, Russia, Korea, India, and Indonesia, have followed suit, holding summits to enhance their ties with Africa.^[9]

Since the first FOCAC was held in Beijing in 2000, China has hosted the summit every three years, alternating with an African host nation. As China’s presence in Africa surged in the mid-2000s, the international community began paying close attention to the scale and content of China’s aid plans for Africa announced at each FOCAC. At the mid-2010s FOCAC, China unveiled a massive aid package of 60 billion USD, showcasing its strong presence in Africa to both domestic and international audiences. However, in the pandemic-hit FOCAC 8, held online in 2021, China reduced its aid amount for the first time in the summit’s history, pledging 40 billion USD, which surprised both China watchers and those in the international development sector.^[10]

With this year’s FOCAC being the first in-person summit in the post-COVID era, attention again focused on the scale of China’s new commitments to Africa.^[11] In the end, China pledged more than 360 billion RMB (about 50 billion USD), surpassing its commitment three years ago by 10 billion USD. However, this also signifies that China, now facing an economic slowdown, has taken on a substantial burden.

What exactly has China gained from this? This article seeks to answer this question from the perspective of geoeconomics,^[12] which analyzes the relationship between economic statecraft and the achievement of a nation’s strategic objectives. In doing so, it draws on the “Aid-for-Policy Deal” theory,^[13] which examines aid as a bargaining tool used by the donor to secure desirable policy concessions from the recipient. While economic benefits, such as resource rights, are often cited as China’s primary gains from cooperation with Africa, through a geoeconomic lens, this article explores the political gains China has secured through its commitment to massive investments pledged at FOCAC 9.

What Did China Gain from FOCAC 9?

Since the establishment of the Xi Jinping administration, the cooperative measures under FOCAC have incorporated various mechanisms aimed at enhancing China’s international influence both within Africa and globally. In this year’s FOCAC, China incorporated more political objectives into the FOCAC outcomes, particularly in the context of competition with the United States. The outcome documents of FOCAC 9 are filled with language challenging U.S. international leadership across various sectors, including currency, trade, peace and security, and global governance.

In terms of currency, much attention has been drawn to the sheer amount of “over $50 billion,” but what stands out in this year’s pledges is the use of “360 billion RMB.” Previous FOCAC pledges had been denominated in U.S. dollars, but this shift to the Chinese yuan could be interpreted as a move by China to hedge against foreign exchange risks and promote the internationalization of the yuan.^[14] While this does not represent a direct challenge to U.S. dollar hegemony, it could at least reduce dependency on the dollar in economic cooperation-related transactions between China and Africa. Moreover, the “Beijing Declaration” condemns and calls for the removal of sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other Western countries on Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In cooperating with these sanctioned countries, there is a strong need for transactions that do not rely on the dollar.

On the trade front, China promised zero tariffs on all imports from least developed countries (LDCs), including 33 African nations, and President Xi proudly declared that this move would turn China’s vast market into a significant opportunity for Africa.^[15] The economic significance of this market opening for the target countries is substantial and is commendable from the perspective of promoting development in Africa’s LDCs. However, expanded access to China’s massive market could also lead to an asymmetrical dependency between the target countries and China, potentially increasing China’s influence over these countries, thus strengthening its geopolitical leverage.^[16]

Regarding the multilateral trade system, the “Beijing Action Plan” advocates for “a universally beneficial, inclusive economic globalization.” In the document, China and Africa jointly reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining the core values and basic principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), opposed decoupling and disruptions in supply chains, and stated their intention to resist unilateral actions and protectionism and shared aim to protect the legitimate interests of developing countries, including China and Africa, while enhancing the dynamism and driving force of global economic growth. As the expansion of global value chains has brought significant benefits to developing countries,^[17] a narrative is being woven that it is China that protects the world’s free trade system, which Western powers, led by the U.S., are trying to distort for their own sake.

FOCAC 9 also served as a platform for China to project its political agenda onto the international stage. The “Beijing Declaration” and “Beijing Action Plan” repeatedly refer to “Chinese-style modernization,” a key theme highlighted at the 20th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China in July. Furthermore, slogans like “African modernization” and “modernization of the Global South” were prominently presented, seemingly elevating the Party’s ideas to international objectives.^[18] Additionally, the “Beijing Action Plan” addresses the need for strengthening global governance in areas such as security, artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, biosecurity, economics, finance, anti-corruption measures, climate change, and maritime issues. This underscores China’s intent to advance its engagement in global governance with Africa’s support.

Particularly noteworthy is the contribution of FOCAC 9 in solidifying China’s global initiatives, especially in the security domain. China expressed its intention to establish regional cooperation models for the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in Africa and initiate early collaboration on the GSI. This is one of the global initiatives put forth by President Xi in recent years as part of China’s vision for building a “community of shared future for mankind.” The GSI presents a comprehensive concept of security, calling for global cooperation on security issues.^[19] However, unlike other initiatives like the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which focuses on development cooperation and has gained some traction, China’s international influence in the security domain has remained limited, and the GSI lacks demonstrable results.^[20] President Xi still wants the GSI to gain traction, particularly in the Global South, and FOCAC 9 provided a platform to demonstrate the practical application of this initiative.

Africa’s Position in the “Aid-for-Policy Deal”

In FOCAC 9, China successfully incorporated its own political goals, influenced by its competition with the U.S., into its cooperation with Africa. From the perspective of the “aid-for-policy deal” theory, it is important to note that China has managed to reduce the costs associated with securing “policy concessions” from the African side, while simultaneously offering large amounts of “aid.” The cooperation items in FOCAC 9, which are favorable to China, were likely easy for the African side to accept. For instance, China’s call to act together in making the current international order, which is led by developed countries, more equitable and just resonated well with African countries, which have a history of colonization and ongoing distrust toward Western countries. Although the narrative of solidarity among Global South countries was easily embraced, China’s cooperation with Africa is not without its challenges. This is framed not as charity from the wealthy, but rather based on the principles of “win-win” and “mutual benefit,” promoting the idea of assistance between developing nations. According to this principle, China is also expected to gain benefits from the cooperation projects, which ultimately leads to the implementation of development cooperation with highly unfavorable commercial loan conditions, setting it apart from the aid provided by developed countries.

That said, China did not achieve everything it wanted in FOCAC 9. In a press conference on September 5, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “China and Africa have agreed to break free from the ‘Small Yard, High Fence’ policy”—a reference to the tightening U.S. export controls—and he emphasized solidarity with Africa in resisting American regulatory measures. However, there is no mention of the “Small Yard, High Fence” in the FOCAC 9 agreement documents, suggesting that the African side was reluctant to explicitly state opposition to a third country like the U.S. in official documents. Developing countries, including those in Africa, are generally reluctant to be drawn into competition between major powers.

The Growing African Agency

Discussions regarding Africa’s ability to assert its agency and fulfill its aspirations in international diplomacy and the global arena, referred to in the African studies literature as the concept of “African agency,”^[21] have been ongoing for over a decade. In reality, Africa has increasingly demonstrated a more assertive stance in international negotiations, contrasting sharply with the traditional stereotype of being a weak entity constantly dictated by international organizations and powerful external actors. Now, Africa is leveraging the growing number of “Africa +1” summits to diversify its partnerships^[22] and avoid dependence on specific countries, thereby enhancing its agency.^[23] If China attempts to impose goals that do not align with Africa’s aspirations as it continues to “politicize” FOCAC, it will likely face difficulties.

The experiences from FOCAC 9 offer valuable lessons for engaging with Global South countries in a world moving towards multipolarity.^[24] The U.S. is also pursuing “Africa +1” summit diplomacy through the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, aiming to strengthen relations with the continent, but at this stage it is difficult to claim that it has been more successful than China’s efforts. South African researcher Jana de Kluiver astutely observes that the U.S. strategy is perceived more as an anti-China policy than an Africa policy.^[25] Similarly, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Japan sought to build a consensus among African nations during TICAD 8 that year to oppose Russia’s aggression.^[26] However, many countries in Africa found it unacceptable to publicly condemn Russia, and this attempt was unsuccessful. In an era where Africa’s presence and agency are growing, it is more essential than ever to negotiate and reach agreements as “equal partners.” If a “+ 1” country wishes to extract strategic benefits from “Africa +1” summits, it must align its goals with Africa’s interests to succeed.

Analyzing the World Defined by the Rising Global South Through the Lens of Geoeconomics

This article surveyed how China has extracted political benefits from FOCAC 9 by promising large-scale economic cooperation, which has led to the promotion of the use of the yuan in African countries, increased trade dependence on China, and the propagation of political narratives favored by China. This phenomenon of utilizing economic cooperation as economic statecraft to achieve national strategic interests has been observed not only in China but in almost all donor countries. However, as mentioned earlier, FOCAC 9 witnessed an unprecedented level of “politicization,” which is influenced by the U.S.-China competition, as evidenced by the outcome documents. As Africa’s presence grows, the competition to strengthen relations with it has intensified, prompting countries to further politically leverage economic cooperation. However, African nations are enhancing their agency and are not merely acting in accordance with the intentions of donor countries. For this reason, the perspective of geoeconomics—which analyzes the economic statecraft of various countries and its effects—is becoming indispensable for assessing the increasing activity of “aid-for-policy deals” in diplomacy toward the Global South.