Security Asia Pacific Geoeconomic Briefing

Why ASEAN is crucial to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

2025.03.04

Since late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe created the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in 2016, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been pivotal to connecting the fast-growing Indian Ocean and Pacific regions.

Japan has stepped up engagement with ASEAN for over a decade. Upon taking office for his second term in 2012, Abe made his first official visit to three of the bloc’s countries — Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia — declaring that “Japan will walk alongside ASEAN as an equal partner.” And this position has been kept alive by Abe’s successors. In 2023, Kishida referred to Southeast Asian nations as Japan’s “closest and most crucial partners” in the Global South.

The reason behind Tokyo’s approach is simple — maintaining the principle of ASEAN centrality, which states that the region should not be dictated by great powers and is critical to a free and open international order. The erosion of this principle could lead to the rivalry between the United States and China becoming the dominant force shaping the Indo-Pacific.

And yet, the tenet of ASEAN centrality is coming under assault from China’s increasing influence.

ASEAN countries have taken pains to assert their autonomy, not taking sides in major power rivalries, a position underpinned by their historical experience of nation-building during the competitive security environment of the Cold War.

Recent incidents show how China’s growing influence is undermining ASEAN unity and centrality. For example, in the South China Sea, landlocked members such as Laos and Cambodia have behaved in ways more aligned with Beijing’s than the bloc’s interests, raising concerns within the group.

Despite this, the U.S. lacks a comprehensive strategic framework for engaging with ASEAN. For instance, when, during his first term, President Donald Trump placed FOIP within Washington’s larger military strategy to counter China, ASEAN countries responded warily as they had hoped for a more comprehensive approach to Beijing.

Whereas the U.S. has not sufficiently considered ASEAN centrality in its FOIP strategy, Japan has pursued a more inclusive approach while ensuring its alliance with Washington remains the cornerstone of its defense.

Tokyo shares the United States’ goal of maintaining a free and open international order based on the rule of law, but it can conduct diplomacy somewhat independently of its principal ally when it comes to ASEAN — with whom it has fostered deep trust based on extensive development cooperation ties.

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Japan’s ASEAN diplomacy

During the second Abe administration, Japan avoided using the term “strategy,” which could imply a military dimension, when referring to FOIP, opting for “vision” instead in consideration of ASEAN countries’ preference. Under the Kishida administration, Japan further strengthened economic cooperation with the bloc, with the prime minister announcing a $100 million contribution to the newly established Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund.

Kishida also stressed the need to align such efforts with those of the “Quad” security dialogue between Japan, the U.S., India and Australia, and by 2023, all Quad members had upgraded their relationships with ASEAN to the level of comprehensive strategic partnerships.

Japan has also implemented projects to enhance ASEAN maritime security, including improving member countries’ law enforcement capabilities to counter China’s growing influence in the East and South China Seas.

These initiatives include having provided Indonesia with a large patrol vessel in 2023 and the Philippines with five such vessels the following year. Japan has also offered maritime surveillance training programs addressing nontraditional security issues such as illegal fishing, suspicious vessels, human trafficking, terrorism, piracy, smuggling and natural disasters.

While efforts to strengthen Southeast Asian security are aligned with the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations in the region, they also show how Japan’s FOIP vision has gradually taken shape as a continuation of its ASEAN diplomacy.

Moreover, concrete cooperation programs outlined in the new FOIP strategy presented by Kishida in 2023 are yielding tangible results. For example, the Self-Defense Forces participated in last year’s Super Garuda Shield in Indonesia, a multinational military exercise led by Washington and Jakarta. Notably, several Indonesian military leaders who led the exercise were alumni of Japan’s Joint Staff College.

The need for flexible cooperation

Japan’s ASEAN diplomacy, shaped by its alliance with the U.S. and respect for the bloc’s autonomy, has allowed for broad economic and security cooperation. But as the U.S.-China conflict intensifies, new dynamics are likely to emerge and Tokyo’s response to them will influence its cooperation with ASEAN within the FOIP framework.

Changes in Southeast Asian countries’ relations with the U.S. in response to the conflict in Gaza or their reaction to supply chain realignments stemming from Sino-American competition could also impact ASEAN unity.

American influence has already declined in some parts of the region. While it remains strong in nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam, both dealing with territorial disputes with China, predominantly Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia have seen rising anti-U.S. sentiment, particularly in response to the Gaza conflict.

According to a survey conducted last year by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, ASEAN respondents who would align with the U.S. if forced to choose between Washington and Beijing fell from 61% the previous year to a little under half.

ASEAN countries, buoyed by their rapid economic growth, are increasingly aware of the need to exert more economic influence globally. For example, while the U.S. and China compete for dominance in electric vehicle production, Indonesia is positioning itself as a hub for Southeast Asia’s EV supply chain, competing with traditional leaders such as Vietnam and Thailand.

These developments could shift the regional framework from a cooperative to a competitive one. Regardless, Japan must remain adaptive to these changes to ensure the FOIP vision continues evolving.

(Photo Credit: The Mainichi Newspapers/ Aflo)

[Note] This article was posted to the Japan Times on February 14, 2024:
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/02/14/world/asean-japan-free-open-indo-pacific/

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