American democracy will weather the Trumpist storm

Satoshi Machidori, Professor, Kyoto University

A month into Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president, his erratic and combative behavior remains unchanged.

Unlike his first administration, which included experienced officials in key roles — adults, essentially — his second government is staffed with people who are first and foremost faithful to the president and his rhetoric.

Trumpism is surprisingly ambiguous, so what does all this mean for American democracy? And how can Japan respond?

Domestically, Trumpism is defined by a small-government ideology that reduces the state’s role in socioeconomic affairs. For example, Trump is busy repealing climate-related measures, wants to cut taxes and will stop short of federal abortion bans, leaving individual states to legislate on this hot button issue.

Internationally, we are seeing a classic case of protectionism involving a heavy-handed use of tariffs and limiting the flow of goods and people, including across the United States’ southern border. Trump’s approach prioritizes pragmatism over ideals, seeking to end conflicts by allowing power imbalances to continue and ignoring questions of legitimacy or humanitarian concerns — as can be seen in his reluctance to aid Ukraine and strong support for Israel.

Trumpism’s short-term, bilateral approach emphasizes self-reliance, even for allies like Japan.

Protectionism, realism devoid of ideals, nationalism and laissez-faire domestic economics are not new concepts. In fact if we look deep back into history, all of these policies were embraced by Republicans during the Industrial Revolution following the American Civil War.

Polarization over pluralism

During the Industrial Revolution, materialism was rampant and wealth disparities grew significantly. At the time, large-scale immigration fueled economic growth by providing labor and an expanded market, while causing social unrest and corruption. Political scientists Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett have noted many similarities between the U.S. then and today, with narrow self-interests often taking precedence over community values.

In the late 19th century, the rise of populism in American politics was a driving force behind political and social reforms. Despite many twists and turns, the U.S. strengthened its democratic institutions and played a major role in expanding this system of government worldwide. Putnam and Garrett argue that by the 1960s, America had become increasingly attentive to the conditions of all people within its borders, strengthening democratic values.

It is overly simplistic to view Trump’s return to the presidency as a subversion of this process of democratization: If this system is premised on politicians responding to people’s expectations, then Trump’s policy stance cannot be dismissed as undemocratic, as some have tried to do, as the essence of his approach is to react to public sentiment. He is, above all, a populist who prioritizes voter approval, regardless of whether his policies are consistent or even effective.

The issue today is that American voters are not shifting from an individualistic to a community-oriented mindset as in the early 20th century. Polarization fueled by interparty conflicts has now extended to the electorate, including independent voters. This has led to “affective polarization,” characterized by people’s distrust and low regard for those in the opposing camp.

Many factors contribute to this fragmentation, from economics, such as the disconnect between national prosperity and individual well-being, cultural issues, like clashes over traditional values and cancel culture, and the information environment, including the proliferation of fake news via social media. Prolonged affective polarization undermines empathy and cooperation, raising concerns about its impact on American democracy.

Another risk is the weakening of political pluralism. Appointments during Trump’s first term solidified conservative dominance of the Supreme Court, underpinned by the Republican Party’s ideological cohesion. Historically, both Republicans and Democrats have accommodated diverse perspectives and groups, but today, intraparty homogeneity has increased. While American society remains diverse, the parties are no longer functioning effectively as conduits between people and political power.

Pluralism is essential for creating space for alternatives and preventing the breakdown of democracy. From the late 19th to the early 20th centuries, reform movements arose within and outside the two major parties, leading to policy innovations. But currently, there is little room for such evolutions. Whether the parties can once again embrace pluralism will determine America’s political future.

What about Japan?

Trump’s presidency — bolstered by Republican control of the executive and both branches of Congress (the so-called trifecta) — might appear formidable. However, it faces two major constraints.

First, the Republican majority in the House is unlikely to last more than two years. In recent history, midterm elections have eroded the majority party’s control. If the Republican agenda — combining tax cuts with high tariffs — accelerates inflation, it could alienate nonwealthy voters.

Second, as a populist, Trump may hesitate to pursue policies that risk losing him voter support. This could hinder foreign policy, including continued involvement in Ukraine, while exacerbating internal conflicts with hard-line conservatives. Even with an inner circle of die-hard loyalists, Trump’s influence is limited without congressional support.

The key is that Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to four years. If it enters a lame-duck phase after the midterms, as is likely, the administration might prioritize cementing its legacy by embarking on disruptive international and security-related policies, potentially undermining global trust in U.S. democracy and stability.

Yet despite Trump’s authoritarian tendencies, his populist nature makes constitutional collapse unlikely so long as pluralism in society endures.

Confronting this situation means understanding that Trumpism is not without precedent. Primarily in the first two years of the presidency, Japan should focus on policies that see the executive and congressional Republicans in agreement. Concurrently, it should prepare for the next phase of U.S. politics, post-2026, by fostering relationships with anti-Trump Republicans and Democrats alike.

The U.S. has been a grand experiment in democracy. Its history shows that this system of government is neither complete nor static, but constantly renewing. Despite the challenges involved in Trumpism, there is little reason to doubt American democracy’s ability to weather the storm.

Japan must therefore use the Trump administration’s demands as opportunities for self-reflection and prepare for political shifts to come.

(Photo Credit: Reuters/ Aflo)

[Note] This article was posted to the Japan Times on February 27, 2024:
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/02/27/japan/american-democracy-will-weather-the-trumpist-storm/

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Author

Satoshi Machidori

Professor, Kyoto University

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in Geoeconomic Briefing do not necessarily reflect those of the International House of Japan, Asia Pacific Initiative (API), the Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG) or any other organizations to which the author belongs.