Air superiority vs. air denial: Redefining U.S. airpower strategy

Air superiority and victory

David Deptula, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general and leading advocate of air-superiority doctrine, highlights two key lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war: Russia’s failure to secure air superiority early on cost it a decisive victory and not doing so left the country vulnerable to attack. These lessons have not been lost on Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force.

Following 9/11, counterinsurgency became the U.S. Air Force’s primary mission during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars against adversaries lacking meaningful airpower. Annual Air Force Posture Statements repeatedly expressed concerns over operational strain from prolonged counterterrorism efforts, declining readiness, modernization delays and force downsizing due to budget constraints. However, preparations for countering China remained secondary.

The 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy under the first Trump administration marked a major shift. Subsequent Air Force posture reports prioritized investments in four key areas to prepare for high-end warfare against China through the concept of Joint All-Domain Command and Control: integrating joint forces into networked systems, securing dominance in space, enabling rapid force generation and strengthening logistics to sustain operations while under enemy attack.

Frank Kendall, who became secretary of the U.S. Air Force in July 2021, outlined key priorities for maintaining conventional military superiority over China. These included enhancing space-based capabilities, accelerating the Next-Generation Air Dominance program, improving mobile threat targeting, advancing the B-21 bomber’s long-range strike capabilities, reinforcing the resilience of air bases and logistical networks and ensuring the Air Force can rapidly transition to wartime operations when necessary.

Meanwhile, Gen. Charles Brown, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, championed the strategic mantra “Accelerate Change or Lose,” urging rapid transformation to address emerging threats. These reforms were driven by an urgent need to counter China’s advancing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which have positioned the Chinese military as a near-peer or superior adversary. The fundamental question remains: how can the Air Force secure air superiority in conflict with China?

The air-denial strategy

Air-denial strategy advocates Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco challenge the traditional belief that “offense is the best defense” and that airpower is inherently offensive. Instead, they argue defense is fundamentally stronger in aerial warfare, with technology and tactical advancements further reinforcing the defending side’s advantage. A scenario where neither side gains air superiority would deter potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Any conflict with China must account for the risk of nuclear escalation. Achieving air superiority would require neutralizing China’s sea-based air defense systems and mainland air bases. Such large-scale air offensives would significantly increase the likelihood of nuclear war, making them strategically flawed.

China’s A2/AD network is robust and breaking through would be extremely difficult and costly. If China launched a full-scale amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait, securing air superiority would be a prerequisite for success. By deploying multilayered, sophisticated air defense systems, the burden of achieving air superiority would shift to China, reducing nuclear escalation risk.

If China understands its air superiority efforts could be effectively countered by advanced missile and air defense systems, a denial deterrence strategy could succeed. This would render China’s military plans unfeasible, forcing it to abandon its objectives. For this to work, the U.S. Air Force should establish air denial as its core mission and take direct responsibility for air defense operations — currently handled by the U.S. Army through Patriot and THAAD missile systems. This contrasts with Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force, which plays a direct air defense role.

Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security adviser in the first Trump administration, expands this concept in his book, “The Boiling Moat.” He advocates turning the Taiwan Strait into a deadly zone for China’s naval forces to prevent large-scale amphibious invasion. While the book doesn’t explicitly address air denial, its core principle aligns with the strategy. If China is denied air superiority, it would reinforce efforts to block invasion from the sea, creating two-layered deterrence.

Optimal resource allocation

Carl von Clausewitz famously stated that “the first, the most far-reaching and the most comprehensive judgment a statesman and commander must make is to determine the kind of war upon which they are embarking.” This raises a fundamental question for the United States: What is the purpose, method and path to victory in a potential war against China? Currently, a clear operational strategy — a formula for victory — has yet to be established.

The defensive posture built around an air-denial strategy could serve as one solution to both winning a conflict with China and deterring one from occurring. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has invested in strengthening Guam’s missile defense system, while the Air Force has focused on expanding forward operating bases and enhancing resilience under the concept of Agile Combat Employment. These investments aim to deny China the ability to launch a successful invasion. Alongside Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines in the first island chain, strengthening this denial posture through joint air and missile defense integration and agile airpower deployment presents a viable strategic option.

Simultaneously, air superiority remains necessary for victory, as demonstrated by Israeli Air Force attacks against Iran followed by U.S. bombing. The challenge is determining how to establish control over contested airspace at critical moments by optimizing available capabilities, including drones and other emerging technologies. As Musk has pointed out, cost-effectiveness is key in resource allocation. Advanced fighter-jet prices have soared, making it essential to incorporate more affordable, expendable systems such as drones. However, weapon system effectiveness must be measured within a well-defined operational strategy context.

As he prepared to leave office, Secretary Kendall placed the service’s largest development initiative — the Next-Generation Air Dominance program — on hold, leaving continuation decisions to the incoming Trump administration. Trump determined to resume the program by naming it F-47. Yet, the formulation of new U.S. strategies toward China and the overall Air Force structure will depend on striking the right balance between air superiority and air denial — between offense and defense.

Synergies in U.S.-Japan alliance

At the first U.S.-Japan summit under the Ishiba and Trump administrations, both sides reaffirmed commitment to strengthening alliance deterrence and response capabilities. This included enhancing command-and-control frameworks between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military, as well as increasing the presence of both forces in the southwestern islands. While no official demand was made for Japan to raise defense spending beyond 3% of gross domestic product, reinforcing joint operational posture remains a top priority for the second Trump administration.

To maximize deterrence against China, the traditional alliance division of roles — the U.S. as the “spear” and Japan as the “shield” — should evolve into more strategically integrated approaches, aligning air-superiority and air-denial concepts between the SDF and U.S. forces. Rather than being constrained by each administration’s politics, both countries must continue deepening pragmatic strategic discussions and advancing concrete measures to strengthen their joint operational posture.

(Photo Credit: US Air Force)

[Note] This article was posted to the Japan Times on July 9, 2025:
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/07/09/world/air-superiority-vs-air-denial/

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