The Geopolitics of Ports and Pipelines: The Case of The Strait of Hormuz -The Struggle Over Chokepoints-

Control of the Strait and the Exercise of Power

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis demonstrates that the concept of geopolitical chokepoints remains crucial even in the modern era. A chokepoint refers to a narrow passage, such as a strait or canal, that must be traversed to move from one location to another; blocking such a passage would have a significant impact on the global economy.

The Strait of Hormuz is located at the junction of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. With a width of approximately 30 km at its narrowest point,^[1]it has long been regarded as a prime example of a chokepoint. While other chokepoints (such as the Panama Canal) can be bypassed—for example, by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope—at a certain cost, the Strait of Hormuz serves as the exit from the Persian Gulf and can completely block traffic through the Gulf. Furthermore, it plays a crucial role not only geographically but also economically. As of 2024, the volume of crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 20 million barrels per day, which accounts for about 20% of global crude oil consumption.

However, Iran’s ability to effectively enforce a de facto blockade^[2] of the Strait of Hormuz is not solely due to the strait’s geographical characteristics. One reason for this is that drones, anti-ship missiles, and GPS jamming are fundamentally transforming the methods used to disrupt maritime traffic routes (hereinafter “sea lanes”).

Mines are a classic example of traditional methods for disrupting sea lanes, but once laid, they are difficult to remove, and their deployment poses a high operational hurdle even for the party laying them. In contrast, drones, anti-ship missiles, and GPS jamming have the distinct advantage of allowing for flexible control over intensity and timing. If sporadic attacks using drones or similar means occur in a specific sea area, shipping companies face the risk of exposing their crews to grave danger. Additionally, issues such as insurance companies suspending war risk coverage for that area arise, making navigation difficult. Given these factors, the need to physically prevent all vessels from navigating the strait—effectively blockading it—has diminished in modern times, and it can be said that disrupting sea lanes is becoming a more readily employable tactic.

On the other hand, ships bound for China, India, and Pakistan are reported to have passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, on March 20, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that Iran was prepared to allow Japanese ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also sent a note to the UN Security Council and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) stating that non-hostile vessels may be allowed to pass. Moreover, Iran’s parliament is reportedly planning to impose transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, indicating a willingness to permit navigation under specific conditions or for specific countries.

Does the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz constitute an effective exercise of power by Iran? Political scientist Robert Dahl defines power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” If that is the case, it can be argued that Iran aims to gain the power to draw other nations into its side and halt attacks by the U.S. and Israel, by selectively permitting the passage of ships bound for specific countries or destinations. However, as seen in the “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz” released on March 18, the condemnation of the de facto blockade by many countries is primarily directed at Iran and is not directly linked to condemnation of the U.S. or Israel. In terms of Iran’s original objective—to halt the use of force by the U.S. and Israel—it can be said that these actions have not been sufficiently effective at this point.

The Geopolitics of Ports and Pipelines

While the geographical reality that the Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint cannot be artificially altered, neighboring countries have sought to free themselves from this constraint by constructing transportation infrastructure and developing ports. As of March 2026, there are two ports capable of exporting crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the UAE without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

The first is the Port of Yanbu, located on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia. With the aim of partially overcoming the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia began construction of the East-West Pipeline (Abqaiq-Yanbu Pipeline) in 1981, during the Iran-Iraq War. This pipeline, with a total length of 1,200 km, runs from oil fields in eastern Saudi Arabia across the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea coast, and has a transport capacity of approximately 5 million barrels per day. Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company, states that the pipeline’s capacity has been expanded to 7 million barrels per day, but it remains unclear whether continuous operation at maximum capacity is feasible. In any case, the initiative undertaken by Saudi Arabia 45 years ago is arguably becoming the country’s most important asset today.

The second is the Port of Fujairah in the UAE. Located in the Gulf of Oman beyond the Strait of Hormuz, the Port of Fujairah allows crude oil to be loaded onto tankers and exported without being affected by a blockade of the strait. The Hubshan–Fujairah crude oil pipeline is used to transport crude oil to the Port of Fujairah. It is a 370-kilometer pipeline connecting Habshan, home to onshore oil fields in Abu Dhabi, to Fujairah on the Indian Ocean coast, with a transport capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day. The Abu Dhabi government-backed fund decided to construct this pipeline in 2008 with the aim of shipping crude oil without passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint. The pipeline was completed in July 2012, and crude oil transportation began in April 2013.

However, these alternative routes also have their problems. First, there is the issue of the pipelines’ maximum transport capacity. Approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily, and the combined transport capacity of these pipelines—about 6.8 million barrels—is insufficient to serve as a viable alternative. While the initiatives by Saudi Arabia and the UAE were intended to mitigate risks, they were designed to serve only as partial alternatives and did not account for a scenario like the current situation, where passage through the Strait of Hormuz has become virtually impossible and may remain so for an extended period.

Second, there is a risk that the infrastructure itself—such as ports and pipelines—could come under attack. In fact, on March 19, the Samref refinery in Yanbu was attacked, and the port of Fujairah in the UAE has also been targeted multiple times. In addition, the Nustanara refinery in Saudi Arabia, the LNG plant in the Ras Laffan industrial area in Qatar, and the Ruwais refinery in the UAE have all been subjected to drone attacks from Iran.

Third, there is a risk that ships departing from these two ports could be attacked. In particular, in the Red Sea, ships departing from the Port of Yanbu must pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, exposing them to the risk of attack by the Houthis, a pro-Iranian armed group in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in particular, is situated in a vulnerable position sandwiched between two chokepoints and is thus exposed to risks from both sides.

Of these, the route via the UAE’s Fujairah Port is considered particularly high-risk due to its

geographical proximity to Iran. Furthermore, regarding the route from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Port through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the Red Sea, particular attention must be paid to the activities of the Houthis. Iran has reportedly instructed the Houthis to prepare for attacks on ships in the Red Sea, and the risk is escalating. In other words, there is no magic bullet to avoid the risk of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the options for mitigating that risk are limited. Among those options, the route from the Port of Yanbu through the Suez Canal and around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa to Japan is considered relatively safe.

Options for Japan, a Maritime Nation

Japan relies heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for crude oil shipments and is extremely vulnerable to a de facto blockade of the strait. On the other hand, as an ally of the U.S.—which has used military force against Iran—Japan finds itself in a difficult position: given the deteriorating security environment surrounding the country, it cannot afford to damage its bilateral relationship with the U.S. Under these circumstances, what course of action should Japan take?

First, Japan must consider the risks of accepting the exercise of power to control the strait. Although Iran has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), given the volume of shipments and the volume of vessel traffic, the Strait of Hormuz can be considered an international strait under customary international law. Under international law, vessels are granted the right of passage under certain conditions, and coastal states of international straits are required not to impede the passage of such vessels.

From Iran’s perspective, the Strait of Hormuz is its territorial sea, and it is in a position to exercise its sovereignty. However, imposing tolls or granting selective passage based on nationality or destination violates the principle of the open seas. It is important to note that if Japan were to obtain passage permission by accepting certain conditions, this could send the wrong message to China, which is taking aggressive actions in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. For Japan, it is important to respond through multilateral cooperation based on the “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz,” issued on March 18, rather than seeking permission for navigation solely for Japan.

Next, while carefully assessing risks and costs, we must meet demand by combining measures such as maximizing the use of alternative routes like the Port of Yanbu, exploring new sources of supply, and utilizing oil reserves. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan’s defining characteristic is that it is surrounded by oceans, which grants it a high degree of freedom in sourcing. This fundamentally differs from landlocked countries, which are situated inland and have their transport routes and sources of supply fixed by pipelines. It is essential to make the most of the advantages offered by this freedom of maritime transport.

For example, one possible route involves transporting oil from the Port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia through the Suez Canal and around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa to Japan. Compared to routes passing through the Port of Fujairah in the UAE—which is geographically close to Iran—or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where there is a risk of attacks by the Houthis, this route carries relatively lower risk and could also resolve the issue of war risk insurance, which has been a challenge for shipping companies. However, the cost of transporting crude oil shipped from the Port of Yanbu via the Suez Canal to Asian countries, including Japan, would be substantial. In response to rising transportation costs and the resulting surge in energy prices, it may be necessary to consider government subsidies depending on the situations.

Efforts by individual companies to secure alternative supplies are also underway. On March 23, Shunichi Kito, Chairman of the Petroleum Association of Japan, indicated that North America and regions in Central and South America—such as Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico—are being considered as potential sources for crude oil procurement by member companies. Since the facilities at many Japanese refineries are optimized for Middle Eastern crude, companies will likely to evaluate potential suppliers by carefully assessing the characteristics of the crude oil.

The Japanese government has not been entirely unprepared for a deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. By the end of December 2025, Japan had built up oil reserves equivalent to approximately eight months’ supply. While these reserves do not constitute a permanent solution to a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, they do provide a temporal buffer until a resolution is reached. It is necessary to make the most of this buffer while exploring procurement via alternative routes and seeking new suppliers.

However, for Japan—where 93% of crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz—it will be difficult to meet domestic demand over the long-term relying solely on new supply routes, new suppliers, and oil reserves. Following the 1973 oil crisis, Japan reduced its dependence on the Middle East to 68% by 1985 through crude oil imports from countries such as Indonesia, China, Mexico, and Malaysia. However, due to subsequent declines in oil production and rising domestic demand in those countries, Japan was forced to return to rely on the Middle East.

While the impact of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz varies by country, if the current situation persists, the global economy will inevitably be affected. Major U.S. oil companies are reported to have warned the Trump administration of the potential for a worsening energy crisis. While the U.S. imported approximately 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day via the Strait of Hormuz in 2024—equivalent to only 2% of U.S. oil consumption—the U.S. will also be affected by soaring crude oil prices and the resulting deterioration of the global economy.

Japan will need to adopt different approaches toward the parties involved in the conflict. With regard to Iran, Japan should collaborate with Europe and Southeast Asian nations to take an approach based on the principle of “freedom of navigation.” Meanwhile, with regard to the U.S. and Israel, Japan will likely need to intensify its efforts to secure a ceasefire and the resumption of navigation by emphasizing the “actual losses” that could arise in both countries such as inflation, economic downturns, and isolation from the international society, will outweigh the benefits gained through the conflict.

Notes

• ［1］ 
  Iran and Oman each claim the Strait of Hormuz as part of their territorial waters. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has established traffic separation schemes in the Strait to prevent collisions between vessels.
• ［2］ 
  A blockade can be defined as a “belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all States, enemy and neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy State.”

(Photo Credit: AFLO)

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this IOG Commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the API, the Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG) or any other organizations to which the author belongs.

Geoeconomic Briefing

Geoeconomic Briefing is a series featuring researchers at the IOG focused on Japan’s challenges in that field. It also provides analyses of the state of the world and trade risks, as well as technological and industrial structures (Editor-in-chief: Dr. Kazuto Suzuki, Director, Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG); Professor, The University of Tokyo).

Click here for the details